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CASE COMMENTS
Eminent Domain--Just Compensation for Fast Land

The respondent owned riparian land which he had leased to the
state, giving the state an option to purchase, since it was contemplated
that the state would locate a port facility on the land. The United
States Government, however, condemned the land in conjunction with
a congressionally authorized lock and dam project and subsequently
conveyed the land to the state at a price considerably less than the
option price. The compensable value of the land determined by the
judge in the condemnation action was limited to its value for sand,
gravel, and agricultural purposes; the special value of the land as a
port site was not considered, and as a result, the ultimate award to
the respondent was approximately one-fifth of the claimed value of
the land as a port site. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the decision, holding that port site value is compensable under the fifth amendment. Subsequently, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed. The port site value is not
considered inherent in the land itself and therefore need not be considered when determining just compensation for the land. United
States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
The Rands decision follows the principles presented in United
States v. Twin City Power Co.' and serves to reaffirm the Court's
position with respect to the compensable value of fast land2 taken
by the government in eminent domain proceedings. In future condemnation actions these two cases will undoubtedly be relied upon
by the government in attempting to avoid compensation for special
value due to the riparian location of condemned land.
The authority of the government to exercise control over the navigable waters of the United States derives from the commerce clause3
and, as public property of the citizenry, these waters are subject to
legislation by Congress.' Thus, lands adjacent to and beneath navigable waters have become subject to a public easement, vesting in
the government a "dominant servitude" or "superior navigational
easement." This power of the government has been described generally as a privilege of noncompensatory appropriation incident to
' 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
water mark bounds the bed of the river. Lands above it are
fast lands . . . ." United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
509 (1945).
2 "High

3 U.S.

CoNsT. art. I, § 8.

4 Gilman

v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-725 (1865).
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governmental control over navigable waters essential to the flow of
commerce. 5
In accordance with the fifth amendment, the damages awarded to
any property owner whose land is condemned must constitute just
compensation; however, until recently the guidelines of the Court as
to what constitutes just compensation have been vague when applied
to condemnation proceedings concerned with fast lands.' The Rands
and Twin City cases solidly affirm that when the government appropriates fast lands in the interest of navigation, just compensation does not
include the value of the land as a site for port facilities or hydro-electric power operations. In Twin City, the Court said that the landowner
was seeking "a value in the flow of the stream, a value that inheres
in the Government's servitude"' and that the location of the
property was "due to the flow of the stream; and if the United States
were required to pay the judgments below it would be compensating
the landowners for the increment of value added to the fast lands if
the flow of the stream were taken into account."' In the Rands case,
the Court resolved the same issue and commented, "All this was
made unmistakably clear in United States v. Twin City Power Co."9
Before the Twin City and Rands decisions, the Court did not consistently deny the possibility of a riparian landowner being compensated for the added property value attributable to location on a navigable river. In United States v. Virginia Electric and Power Co.,'
the Court was confronted with the problem of determining just compensation for a flowage easement over fast land which was condemned
by the government and held that there could be no recovery for
rights that would be valuable only if the government chose to cause
flooding. However, the Court also observed that "[t]he guiding
principle of just compensation is reimbursement to the owner for
the property interest taken. In many cases this principle can readily be
United States v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1960).
In United States v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 629
(1960), the Court observed that property above the high-water mark of a
stream is not subject to the navigational servitude in favor of the government,
but "the privilege does affect the measure of damages when such land is
taken."
7 United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 225 (1956)
(emphasis added).
8 1d. at 226.
9 389 U.S. 121, 124 (1967).
10 365 U.S. 624 (1960).
5

6
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served by the ascertainment of fair market value."" In spite of this
language, which seemingly indicates that fair market value is a key
factor in determining just compensation, the Court held that "the
nonriparian value of the servient land" 2 was the appropriate general standard to be referred to in valuing the particular interest in
question. Other cases have held that the fair market value includes
the highest and most profitable use of the land, 3 special value,' 4
and loss to the owner;' 5 nevertheless, the final authority is in Twin
City and Rands where the Court held that any specially added value
of riparian land because of its close proximity to a flowing stream will
not be considered in determining fair market value after condemnation.

The problem of just compensation was also treated in United
States v. Chandler-DunbarWater Power Co.;'6 however, the result in
this case was somewhat confusing. The government had condemned
two pieces of riparian property, one of which was to be used as a
power site, and the other for a lock and canal area. In awarding
compensation no special value was attached to the power site property due to its close proximity to flowing water.
In contrast to this, the Court said that the other property, which
was to be used as a lock and canal area, had special value apart
from the flow of the stream. This was because the locks and canal
would aid navigation and because this particular piece of land was the
only acceptable site in the vicinity. In neither the Twin City case nor
the Rands case does the Court thoroughly explain this value distinction.'7 However, the Court in Rands does indicate that if Chandler1"

United States v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633

(1960).

In United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943), the Court

described fair market value as "what a willing buyer would pay in cash
to a willing seller." The Court in Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255
(1934), citing Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 354 (1913), maintains

that a property owner "is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily
as if his property had not been taken."
12

United States v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 635

13

McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342 (1936).

(1960).
14

Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1879).

IsMonongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
16 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
17 In United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 226 (1956),
Mr. Justice Douglas refers to this value distinction only briefly. "It may be
that the Court was influenced by the fact that, on the special facts of the
case, the use of the land for canals and locks was wholly consistent with
the dominant navigation servitude of the United States and indeed aided
navigation. Whatever may be said for that phase of the case, it affords no
support for the respondent, since water-power value . . . was ruled to be
noncompensable in the Chandler-Dunbarcase."
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Dunbar "is to any extent inconsistent with Twin City, it is only the
latter which survives."' 8

Actual condemnation or appropriation of land is not always necessary for these valuation rules to become applicable. In United States
v. Commodore Park Inc.,'9 the government deposited dredged materials into a navigable creek rendering it un-navigable; consequently, the owner of the property contiguous to the creek asked the government for compensation since the fast lands adjacent to the creek
were substantially decreased in market value. But, the court held
that "whatever market value of riparian lands may be attributable to
their closeness to navigable waters, does not detract from the Government's 'absolute power', in the interests of commerce, to make necessary changes in a stream."2
In United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co.,2' the Court
held that when government improvements to appropriated riparian
land increase the value of other land held by the former owner, the
value of the improvements shall be subtracted from the compensation
due the former owner for the condemned land. Arguments have been
made stressing that if increased property value due to riparian location
can be used as a factor to a landowner's disadvantage when determining just compensation, consistency demands that the increased value
factor also be recognized when it works to the landowner's advantage.
The Rands decision, however, asserted that there is no inconsistency
or inequity in the River Rouge holding which merely insured that
private landowners do not receive a windfall at the expense of the
public.
In the Twin City case the Court affirmed that just compensation
for fast lands condemned by the government for navigational purposes does not include any specially added value attributable to the
location of the land and its potential as a power site. "If the owner of
fast lands can demand water-power value as a part of his compensation, he gets the value of a right that the Government in the exercise
of its dominant servitude can grant or withhold as it chooses." 22 It
is to be noted, however, this case was a five to four decision, and the
dissent strongly urged the application of fair market value in com18 United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 126 (1967).

19 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
d. at 391 citing Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713,
724-725 (1865).
20

21 269 U.S. 411 (1926).
22 350 U.S. at 228.
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pensating the landowner. Consequently, it was not until the Rands
decision in 1967 that the Court's position was made concrete. The
two cases make it evident that the Court will strictly support the right
of the Government to limit just compensaion by excluding from fair
market value certain property values that are inurements derived from
the flow of the river. The dominant servitude of the government is
thus extended into the flow of the river, and value imported to
riparian property by the flow is not an asset of private ownership in
the view of the Court.
Robert Mason Steptoe Jr.

Guardian and Ward-Jurisdiction to Award Custody
Carmella Falco was the sole survivor of an automobile accident
which occurred in Virginia, in which her parents, who were New
York residents, were killed. The child was hospitalized in Virginia
for six weeks. Wallace Grills, an uncle from Tennessee, petitioned a
Virginia court to award him custody of the child. Another uncle,
Frank Falco of New York, filed a petition to intervene in the proceedings, alleging that he had been appointed guardian of Carmella by
a New York court. The Virginia court awarded custody of the child
to Grills and the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Held, affirmed. The Virginia court has jurisdiction to award the custody of the child and is not required to give
full faith and credit to the ex parte decree of the New York court
which had appointed Falco to be the child's guardian. Falco v. Grills,
161 S.E.2d 713 (Va. 1968).
In order for the court in Falco to award custody of Carmella, it
was first necessary to deal with the prior New York decree. Accordingly, the court first considered the effect of not enforcing the
New York decree without violating the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution. This was ultimately accomplished
by determining that the full faith and credit clause did not apply
to custody cases. In so holding, Virginia joined several other states
which have reached a similar result.'
Having determined that full faith and credit was inapplicable, the
court in Falco then considered whether it had jurisdiction to award
IEg., Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 580, 136 N.E.2d 866, 868
(1956); In re Burns, 194 Wash. 293, 304, 77 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1938); Metz
v. Morley, 289 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (1968).
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